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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah

Court of Appeals

has

jurisdiction

in this

case

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-103(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW WITH STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Should

this

Court

decline

to

consider

Respondent's

arguments when he fails to marshal the evidence in support of the
trial court's decision, ignoring the substantial evidence that
supports the trial court's decision?
"When the duty to marshal is not properly discharged,
Court]

refuse[s]

to consider

the merits

of

challenges

[the

to the

findings and accept[s] the findings as valid." Mountain States
Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1939).
2.

Should this Court leave undisturbed the findings of fact

and conclusions of law and divorce decree drafted by Petitioner's
counsel, where the trial court repeatedly expressed its careful
consideration of, and complete concurrence with, the same, and
where the findings are supported by the evidence?
"The discretion of adopting the findings as submitted to the
trial court is exclusively in that court as long as the findings
are not clearly contrary to the evidence." Boyer Co. v. Lignell,
567 P.2d 1112, 1114 (Utah 1977).
3.

Should this Court reject Respondent's argument that the

trial court did not enforce the prenuptial agreement and his new
expansive interpretation of the one-page handwritten prenuptial
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agreement, where the trial court enforced the agreement based on
the language of the document?
The

court

reviews

for

correctness

a

trial

court's

interpretation of a premarital agreement. Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT
7, fl8, 994 P.2d 193.
4.

Should this Court uphold the trial court's distribution

of property, where the trial court ruled there was commingling of
and improvement to assets based upon findings of fact supported by
the evidence and where the court found equity required the division
made?
"A trial court has considerable discretion concerning property
distribution in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a
presumption
distribution

of

validity.

only

when

.

.

.

there

[The
is

Court]
x

a

disturbs

such

misunderstanding

a
or

misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial
error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse
of discretion.'" Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (cited and quoted authorities omitted).
5.

Should this Court affirm the award of costs and fees to

Petitioner and award fees to her that are incurred on this appeal,
where the trial court found that the fees were reasonable, that
Respondent had the ability to pay the fees and that Petitioner was
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in need of assistance to pay fees as her monthly expenses consume
her monthly income?
"Both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of
such fees are within the sound discretion of the trial court."
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1)
In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce,
Chapter 4, Separate Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7,
Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any action to
establish an order of custody, parent-time, child
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, the court may order a party to pay the costs,
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness
fees, of the other party to enable the other party to
prosecute or defend the action. The order may include
provision for costs of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1)
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children,
property, debts or obligations, and parties. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a divorce case. Petitioner/Appellee,

Kathryn

Brough, and Respondent/Appellant, Richard Brough, began cohabiting
on

December

1,

1997

and

married

on

July

14,

1998. R.

366.

Petitioner filed her Petition for Divorce on August 30, 20 05, R. 24, the trial court conducted a bench trial on July 9, 2008, R. 31516, and the trial court signed its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on August 28, 2008. R. 350-71. In general, the court awarded
Respondent the value of his premarital trucking business and his
3

separate property in Randlett, and the court divided equally the
properties acquired or improved during the marriage, comprised of
a crane business and a home.
Respondent's position at trial was that the Petitioner should
take nothing from the marriage, R. 303-14; 598:256,260, and that
she should further pay the costs for the court-ordered appraisal of
the crane business, including paying for Respondent's time with the
court-ordered appraiser. R. 598:264. Petitioner's posture was that
she was entitled to an equitable interest in the family business
and the home and she should be reimbursed for her attorney fees. R.
598:249-54,264-68. Once the Petitioner obtained employment after
the parties separated, she waived her claim to alimony.
Following the entry of the trial court's decree, Respondent
filed several motions. On September 25, 2008, the trial court held
a hearing on the post-trial motions, and, after receiving argument
from counsel, the trial court denied the post-trial motions. R.
5 99. Respondent then appealed.
Proceedings Below
Petitioner filed her Petition for Divorce on August 30, 2005.
R. 2-4. Respondent's Answer was filed on September 27, 2005. R. 1620. The trial court, after a hearing on October 13, 2005, entered
a temporary order. R.

23. Petitioner

filed a Motion to Order

Appraisals on June 19, 2006, asking that the family business,
Brough

Trucking

&

Crane

Service,

4

Inc.

(Brough

Trucking)

be

appraised. R. 43-45. Respondent filed his response in opposition on
July 10, 2006. R. 51-78. On July 17, 2006, Respondent's counsel,
Mary Ann Hansen, filed her Notice of Withdrawal. R. 79-80. On July
25, 2006, Respondent's second attorney, Dusten L. Heugly, filed his
Notice

of

Substitution

of

Counsel. R.

91-92.

The

trial

court

entered its Ruling on the appraisal motion on August 8, 2006, R.
96-97, and its Order on August 21, 2006, instructing Respondent to
cooperate with an appraiser and to pay the costs of the appraisal
of the business. R. 98-100. On September 5, 2007, Randall Gaither,
current counsel for Respondent, entered his appearance. R. 152-53.
After completion of the appraisals and discovery, the trial court
held a bench trial on July 9, 2008. R. 315-16. At the conclusion of
the trial, the trial court made some brief comments, aigreed to
enter findings and an order divorcing the parties (Mr. Gaither was
requested to prepare these documents) and requested each party to
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and a
proposed decree as it related to the division of the assets. R.
598:268-70. Both parties submitted their proposed documents. R.
323-71. The trial court adopted Petitioner's proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law and decree and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. R. 350-71.
On September 12, 2008, Respondent filed his Motion to Stay
Judgement and Request to Submit, Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,
Objections to Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, Motion for
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Relief from Judgment and Order, Motion for New Trial, Memorandum in
Support of Pending Motions and Notice of Hearing. R. 387-480.
Petitioner

filed

a

memorandum

in

opposition

to

Respondent's

motions. R. 493-502. On September 25, 2008, the trial court held a
hearing on Respondent's motions and, after argument, denied the
motions. R. 599. The trial court also entered the findings of fact
and conclusions of law and the divorce decree prepared by Mr.
Gaither divorcing the parties. R. 504-08. The trial court's Order
(on the September 25th hearing) denying Respondent's post-trial
motions was entered on October 14, 2008. R. 517-19. This appeal
followed. R. 510-11.
Facts
The following recitation of facts essentially reproduces the
findings

of

fact adopted by

the

trial court, with

additional

detail, and includes references to the record. Additionally, at the
end of each paragraph, there is a citation to the corresponding
finding(s) entered by the trial court.
Petitioner worked for NJ Trucking, a small trucking company
owed by Respondent, from 1993 to 1995. R. 598:9-10. She then worked
for her former husband, Bobby Baum, until they separated in 1997.
R. 598:10, In September of 1997, she again started working for NJ
Trucking. R. 598:11. On December 1, 1997, the parties started
living together and they married on July 14, 1998. R. 598:11,13.
(Findings 2-3, R. 3 66) .

6

At the time the parties married, Respondent had two minor
children from a previous marriage. R. 598:13. One of the reasons
the parties married was to assist Respondent in obtaining custody
of those two minor children. R. 598:13-14. (Finding 4, R. 366).
Respondent also had two older children who were of majority
age. R. 598:13. Those children insisted that Petitioner sign a
prenuptial

agreement. R.

598:14-15. Respondent

stated

that he

thought the request was dumb. R. 598:15. Petitioner, to appease the
two children, called an attorney, but, when informed of the cost of
preparing a prenuptial agreement, elected to write out a brief
statement which she and Respondent signed. R. 598:15. (Finding 5,
R. 366).
That statement provides: U I Kathryn Curfew Baum am in no way
associated with and hold no claim to any personal properties,
assets or money of Richard James Brough, N.J. Trucking Inc., the
Glass Store, any personal or family properties. Also I will not be
liable for any debts that occure

[sic] from any of the above

properties. Richard James Brough will not be liable for any debts
that Kathryn Curfew Baum has acquired." Addendum A.
Prior

to drafting

and

signing

the document

there was no

discussion as to or disclosure of what each party owned, R. 598:1617, and, at the time, Petitioner was not aware of what was in NJ
Trucking. R. 598:16. The intent of the document was that it apply
to assets owned on the date of marriage and not to any after-
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acquired assets or improvements to assets. R. 598:16. (Finding 5,
R. 366) .
At the time of the marriage, Mr. Brough owned a business
called the Glass Shop that no longer exists, R. 598:17, family
property in Randlett, R. 5 98:17, a home in Duchesne that had a
large mortgage against it, R. 598:221-22, and a small trucking
business

called

NJ

Trucking.

R.

598:16. Mr.

Brough

was

also

purchasing acreage in Bandana Ranches for which payments continued
to be made during the marriage. R. 598:223. (Finding 6, R. 365).
At the time of the marriage, NJ Trucking had some vehicles,
trailers and equipment. R. 598:217-20; Resp.'s Trial Ex. 27 (2006
Federal Summary Depreciation Schedule). At the time of the trial,
NJ Trucking no longer existed and its few remaining assets were in
Brough Trucking. R. 598:32-33. NJ Trucking had been valued by Mr.
Brough at $44,000 a few years prior to the marriage in Mr. Brough's
prior divorce. R. 5 98:218. At the time of trial, some equipment
remained from NJ Trucking, and the cost to acquire that equipment
when

it

was

depreciated

new
value

was
of

$93,124.00.
the

equipment

Resp.'s
at

the

Trial
time

Ex.
of

27.

The

trial

was

$3,151.00. Resp.'s Trial Ex. 27. The 1999 financial records and tax
return show that NJ Trucking had gross income of $188,785.00.
Pet.'s Trial Ex. 28 (1999 Tax Return). (Finding 7, R. 365).
After the parties' marriage, the parties changed NJ Trucking
and started Brough Trucking. R. 598:30. They purchased a crane for
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$130,000 and other heavy equipment and went into the crane and
oilfield related business, incurred debt to purchase the equipment
for which both parties were liable, and changed the name to Brough
Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. R. 598:30-33,219; Resp.'s Trial
Ex. 27. Respondent remained the sole shareholder. R. 598:147-48. In
2004, the year before the parties separated, the gross income had
increased to $785,250.00. R. 598:221; Pet.'s Trial Ex. 29 (2004 Tax
Return). Both parties worked for Brough Trucking. R. 598:23,33-34.
They seldom took salaries and paid for most of the family and
personal expenses from Brough Trucking, including items such as
vehicles, fuel, clothing, utilities, furniture and groceries. R.
598:34,86,95,138-39,213. The parties personally and jointly took
out a $160,000.00 loan that was used to pay off the debt on the
crane and other equipment. R. 598:47,219. The marital home was used
as collateral for the loan. R. 598:47. The net value of Brough
Trucking at the time of the trial was $492,000.00. Pet.'s Trial Ex.
3 (Townsend appraisal). (Finding 8, R. 364-65).
When the parties started living together and at the beginning
of the marriage, they lived in a home in Duchesne that was owned by
Respondent, which was subject to a substantial mortgage, requiring
$1,300.00 per month payments

to be made

during

the marriage,

598:221-22. Those payments were made from earnings of the parties
and Brough Trucking. R. 598:222. Petitioner, with her own labor and
the assistance of her son, remodeled the Duchesne house, including
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making a room out of the patio, adding walls and windows, taking
out a sliding glass door to open up an area, painting, installing
sheet rock, carpet and siding, and replacing the old shower with a
new bathtub. R. 5 98:19-21,116-18. She also remodeled the downstairs
and added a wall, installed sheet rock, painted and added carpet,
put in light fixtures, and did yard work. R. 598:19-21,116-18.
(Findings 9-10, R. 364).
Shortly

after

the parties

married

in September

of 1998,

Respondent's son, Bryan, age 14, came to live with the parties. R.
598:22. He wanted to go to school in Roosevelt. R. 598:22. Just
prior to the parties starting to live together, Respondent had
purchased a shop in Roosevelt

to use

for Brough Trucking. R.

5 98:25. That shop was dirty and needed repairs. R. 598:25. The
parties decided to construct living quarters in the Roosevelt shop,
to enable them to move to Roosevelt to accommodate Respondent's
son's desire to attend school there. R. 598:25. (Finding 11, R.
364) .
Petitioner, primarily by herself, but with assistance of her
children, Respondent's children and a few others, built a bedroom,
bathroom and living area upstairs in the Roosevelt shop. R. 598:2527,118-19. Her work included installing walls, electrical wires,
sheet rock, tile and carpet. R. 598:25-27,118-19. Downstairs, she
put in 2 bedrooms, a kitchen, cleaned the shop and added floor
tiles. R. 598:25-27,118-19. Carpets were added to all living areas
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and an office was constructed downstairs. R. 598:26. (Finding 12,
R. 363-64).
In August of 1999, Respondent's youngest daughter, Amanda, age
12, came to live with the parties. R. 598:28. The parties and the
children

moved

from

Duchesne

to

the

living

quarters

in

the

Roosevelt shop. R. 598:28. (Finding 13, R. 363).
From the time the Respondent's children moved in with the
parties, Petitioner acted as the children's mother, R. 598:29,121.
She did laundry, cooking and cleaning for them, dealt with them
when

they were

skipping

school

and helped

them graduate

from

school, spent money out of her personal accounts to purchase items
for the children such as school pictures, vehicle tires and a truck
battery, among other things, and gave the children spending money.
R. 598:29,35,57. (Finding 28, R. 358-59).
The parties lived in the Roosevelt shop for roughly two years.
R. 598:36. About the time they moved into the shop, they started
looking

for

a

house.

R.

598:36.

Petitioner

looked

at

many-

properties but did not find anything acceptable to both peirties. R.
598:36. In the summer of 2000, the parties talked to a man named.
Clare Duncan, who said he had some acreage for sale. R. 5 98:36.
The parties inspected the property, approximately 18 acres near
Neola, Utah, and made an offer of $50,000.00. R. 598:36-37. That
offer was accepted and the transaction closed on August 3, 2000. R.
598:37-39. The parties paid $20,000 down and jointly signed a
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promissory note for the balance of $30,000.00. R. 598:37-38. The
property

was

$20,000.00

deeded

down

jointly

payment

was

to

the

paid

parties.

from

NJ

R.

598:38.

Trucking,

just

The
as

virtually all other family bills were paid from NJ Trucking and
Brough Trucking. Resp.'s Trial Ex. 15(a); R. 598:24. (Finding 14,
R. 363) .
After purchasing

the acreage,

the parties

had

blueprints

prepared, based upon a floor plan Petitioner found, and the parties
retained a general contractor. R. 598:40. Construction on the home
started in early 2001. R. 598:40. Petitioner was responsible for
coordinating the work. R. 598:40. She went to the construction site
on a daily basis. R. 598:40. In addition to coordinating with the
contractors, she picked up materials and also worked on the home.
R. 598:40-41. The home is a large log home, and Petitioner was the
person who chinked

(put putty) between the logs. R. 598:41. She

often worked from dawn until dusk on tlle home. R. 598:119-20.
(Finding 15, R. 362-63).
During the home-building process, Respondent fired the general
contractor and Petitioner then took over the completion of the
home. R. 598:40-43. Additionally, in July of 2001, Respondent broke
his foot and was unable to help on the home, and was also unable to
work

at

Brough

Trucking

for

about

a

year.

R.

598:46,210.

Petitioner, with limited assistance from others, did the insulating
of the home, completed the sheet rock installation (utilizing about

12

12 0 sheets) , built

a

fruit

room,

constructed

a gun

room

for

Respondent, and painted, wallpapered and carpeted the home. R.
598:42-44. The parties and Respondent's two children moved into the
home on Thanksgiving of 2001. R. 598:45. Petitioner also did the
landscaping, including putting in the yard, trees and an orchard,
a sprinkling system, and a fire pit. R. 598:45. She constructed a
fence,

which Respondent

later replaced with a pipe

fence. R.

598:45. Once the pipe fence was in place, Petitioner painted it two
times per year. R. 598:45. Petitioner put in a swimming pool, which
Respondent desired, and worked on the wood deck. R. 598:44-45.
(Finding 16, R. 362).
The monies for constructing the Neola home and yard were paid
primarily from Brough Trucking while some payments were made from
Respondent's personal checking account and some from Petitioner's
personal checking account. Resp.'s Trial Ex. 15(a); R. 598:68-69.
The value of the home at the time of trial was $325,000.00. Pet.'s
Trial Ex. 1 (Barneck appraisal) . It is owned by the parties in
joint tenancy. R. 598:37-38. (Findings 17-18, R. 362).
During the marriage, Respondent worked for NJ Trucking and
later Brough Trucking (except for the year from the summer of 2 001
until the summer of 2002 when his leg was broken). R. 598:14 7,210.
Petitioner was involved in the remodeling and building of the
living quarters, the maintaining of the home and family and she
also

worked

at

Brough

Trucking.
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R.

598:18-23,25-26,29,33,40-

4 6,54,91-92.

She

did

everything

from

cleaning

the

shop,

to

secretarial work, to driving a truck on occasions as needed. R.
598:11,33,248. The parties seldom took salaries from the business
but rather elected to pay their living expenses and debt thru the
business.

R.

598:23,34,54-55,213.

W2

records

indicate

that

Petitioner was paid $3,360 in 1999, $10,640.00 in 2000, $8,880 in
2001,

$7,680.00

in 2002 and

$6,876.00

in 2003.

R. 598:93-95;

Resp.'s Trial Ex. 10. While Petitioner took regular salary checks
for her work for the company prior to the marriage, after the
marriage, she took salary only on occasion, R. 598:94, because the
parties were "[t]rying to build things together." R. 598:23. For
the entire year of 1999, when Petitioner remodeled the Duchesne
home, began working

on the Roosevelt

shop and worked

regular

workdays in Roosevelt, commuting with Respondent from Duchesne to
Roosevelt,

she

took

only

$3,360

as

salary.

R.

598:22-23,95.

(Finding 19, R. 361-62).
The parties maintained separate checking accounts, R. 598:34,
but both were signatories on the account for Brough Trucking, and
living expenses were paid by both parties out of the company
account.

R.

598:34.

When

Petitioner

did

take

the

occasional

paycheck, she deposited her checks into her account and then used
those monies for the parties' animals, landscaping for the Neola
home and for Respondent's children who would ask her for cash. R.
598:35,94. Respondent deposited monies in his account and used the
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funds primarily to pay child support and legal fees in the early
part of the marriage and for personal and family expenses after
obtaining custody of his two children. R. 598:222-224. Since the
parties took minimal salaries, almost all living expenses, food,
utilities, transportation, housing (including the remodeling of the
shop and Duchesne house, mortgage payments and building of the
Neola home) were paid from Brough Trucking. R. 5 98:24,34,42,13839,222,233-34. (Finding 19, R. 361).
During the course of the marriage, the parties sold some of
the properties

that existed at the time of the marriage. The

Bandana Ranch property was sold on August 22, 2000, and the funds
received

were

deposited

into

Respondent's

personal

checking

account. R. 598:227-28. The Duchesne shop was sold on May 3, 19 99.
The down payment of $28,983 was received, and deposited in the NJ
Trucking

account

598:224-26.

where

it was

used

on

trucking

expenses.

R.

A check for the Duchesne shop in the amount of $54,000

was deposited

in the NJ Trucking

account

on May

1, 2000, R.

5 98:232, and was used to pay company expenses. R. 598:226. Some
used oilfield equipment including a derrick was sold and the monies
deposited

in the NJ Trucking account or Respondent's

personal

account. R. 598:178-79,198. (Findings 22-24, R. 360; Conclusions 68, R. 353-54).
On October

9, 2002,

the parties borrowed

$160,000.00

and

jointly signed a promissory note for $160,000.00. R. 598:47; Pet.'s
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Trial

Ex.

13

(Promissory Note) . The

family home was used

as

collateral. R. 598:47. The money was used to pay off the loan on
the crane and other equipment titled in Brough Trucking, to secure
a

lower

interest

Respondent's

rate

and

to

pay

expenses

caused

by

the

inability to work because of his broken foot. R.

598:47-48,244.

Respondent testified at trial that, because of his

broken leg and his inability to work for a year, the money was
needed to keep Brough Trucking operating. R. 598:168-69. (Finding
25, R. 359).
After completing the construction of the home in Neola, the
parties decided to further expand Brough Trucking. R. 598:48. In
March 2004, they purchased 80 acres in Ballard to be used for a
gravel pit and fill dirt. R. 598:48-50; Pet.'s Trial Ex. 20-22. The
80 acres was titled in Brough Trucking. R. 598:50.

Petitioner

remodeled an old trailer house which was moved to the property to
be used as a scale house and office. R. 598:91-92. That remodeling
entailed extensive work, including work on the inside and outside
of the trailer. R. 598:92. The purchase price for the 80 acres was
paid thru Brough Trucking. R. 598:171. (Finding 26, R. 359).
In May

2004,

the

parties

jointly

acquired

4 acres

with

utilities adjacent to the 80 acres. R. 598:51-52. The 4 acres were
titled in the names of the parties as joint tenants. R. 598:52. The
purchase price was paid thru Brough Trucking
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598:172. Later,

the parties deeded that property to Brough Trucking. R. 598:53.
(Finding 27, R. 359) .
Shortly after Respondent's daughter, Amanda, turned 18, she
and Petitioner had an argument. R. 598:56-57. Respondent then told
Petitioner to vacate the home. R. 598:57. Petitioner left the home
on August 1, 2005, taking very few personal items with her. R.
598:57-58. She came back the next day and loaded some items into a
horse trailer. R. 598:58-59. Respondent, however, took back the
horse trailer with most of the items. R. 598:59. The personal
property

is

all

used

and

has

minimal

value.

R.

598:96-102.

(Findings 29-30, R. 358).
After the parties separated, Petitioner, who is in her midfifties and did not graduate from high school, R. 598:7-8, obtained
employment

as

insulation on

a

laborer

with

Stanco

Insulation,

lines, tanks and buildings

installing

in the oilfield.

R.

598:60. At the time of trial, Petitioner resided with and cared for
her mother. R. 598:60. She had purchased,

for $10,000, a used

trailer to set up next to her mother's home, and she is making
payments on the $10,000 owed. R. 598:88. Her net monthly income at
trial was $1,656.00 with expenses of $1,695.00 per month. R. 598:6;
Pet.'s Trial Ex. 5 (Financial Declaration). (Finding 31, R. 358).
Respondent, meanwhile, continues to reside in the Neola home
and to operate Brough Trucking. R. 598:145-47. He continues to pay
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his personal expenses including legal fees through Brough Trucking.
R. 598:137-38. (Finding 32, R. 3 5 8 ) .
IIUMiM »F i
n i >1 AK^UMEN'l

1.

Respondent fails to marshal the evidence that buttresses

the trial court's decision, but rather advances a version of the
facts he believes sustains his position that he is entitled to all
the property. That position is not supported by the evidence, was
not agreed to by the court and, because Respondent fails to marshal
the evidence, should be rejected by this Court.
2.

The trial court's procedure in having the parties prepare

proposed findings and a decree does not offend Utah law. A court
may exercise this option to assist the court in making its final
decision and may even adopt proposed findings without amendment, as
long as the court agrees with the proposed documents and they are
not clearly contrary to the evidence. In this case, the trial court
repeatedly expressed its careful consideration of and agreement
with the findings and they are supported by the record.
3.

The trial court

properly interpreted and applied the

terms of the prenuptial agreement when it divided the property. The
language of the document supports Petitioner's argument as to the
meaning of the document. Additionally, even if the meaning were
unclear,
agreement

Petitioner's
and

explanation

the parties' actions
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as

to

the

support

purpose

the

trial

of

the

court's

interpretation thereof, and Respondent offered no testimony as to
an alternative interpretation.
4.

The facts fully support the trial court's finding that

the parties had commingled assets, had used earnings from their
marital labor to improve, acquire and enhance assets and that the
Petitioner had substantially enhanced the value of the business and
homes thru her efforts. Respondent's efforts to trace monies from
the sale of assets fell short, as Respondent's testimony as to
certain alleged traceable transactions conflicted with the evidence
and Respondent further conceded that the monies he deposited from
the sale of separate properties were not segregated, but were
placed

in company

accounts

and used

for general business

and

personal purposes. Moreover, given the circumstances of the case,
it would be manifestly inequitable to deprive Petitioner of any
interest in the properties.
5.
incurred

The

court

for

the

properly

divorce.

awarded

Respondent

Petitioner
does

not

the

fees

she

challenge

the

reasonableness of the fees and does not claim that Respondent is
unable to pay court-ordered costs and fees. Petitioner's monthly
expenses fully deplete her monthly income, and she is in need of
assistance to pay her fees. Petitioner should also be awarded the
fees she incurs on appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.

RESPONDENT FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS, AND THE COURT SHOULD
NOT CONSIDER HIS OBJECTIONS TO HE FINDINGS.

Rule
requires

24(a) (9)
that

• ::d: the

" [a] party

I Jta 1 1 R"i L

challenging

of

a fact

Appellate

Procedure

finding must

first

marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.''
The

party

must

"then

demonstrate

that

the

evidence

is

legally

insufficient to support the finding even in viewing it in the light
most favorable to the court below." Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846
P.2d 1282, 1286
776

P.2d

(Utah 1993)

896, 899

(quoting Reid v. Mut. of Omaha Ins.,

(Utah 1989)).

Meeting

the marshaling

mandate

requires more than including "some evidence that supports the . .
. findings,"

West v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ^16, 48 P.3d 888, and, if

"the

marshal

duty

to

is

not

properly

discharged,

[the

Court]

refuse [s] to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and
accept [s]

the

findings

as

valid."

Oneida/SLIC

v.

Oneida

Cold

Storage, 872 P. 2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Mountain
States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d at 5 5 3 ) .
Expanding upon these precepts, this Court, in West Valley City
v. Majestic Investment Co., explained the marshaling obligation as
follows:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's
advocate. Counsel must extricate himself or herself from
the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's
position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
20

competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings the appellant resists. After constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence.
The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince
the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon
the evidence is clearly erroneous.
818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (1991) (emphasis in original).
Respondent falls substantially short of meeting the marshaling
threshold. He makes no attempt to assume the persona of "devil's
advocate." Due to the procedure the trial court employed in having
the parties prepare proposed findings and the court's adoption of
Petitioner's proposed findings, the findings of fact made by the
trial court are, with minor exceptions, replicated in the fact
section above. Those findings, as illustrated by the citations, are
supported by the record. Yet, in his recitation of the facts,
Respondent outlines his account of events and resolves all factual
disputes in his favor, without referring to facts that undermine
his stance and that support the trial court's determinations. In
short,

he

respectfully

fails

to

submits

marshal
that

the

the

evidence,

Court

should

and
not

Petitioner
contemplate

Respondent's assault on the findings.
II•

THE PROCEDURE OF HAVING EACH PARTY SUBMIT PROPOSED
FINDINGS AND A DECREE IS CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN UTAH
COURTS AND THE COURTS ADOPTION OF PETITIONER'S
FINDINGS WAS APPROPRIATE, WHERE THE COURT AGREED
WITH THE FINDINGS AS DRAFTED, AND THE FINDINGS ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

As indicated in State v. James, "to assist a trial court in
making the necessary findings for a particular case, the court may
21

request counsel to submit proposed findings."1 858 P. 2d 1012, 1015
(Utah Ct. App.

1993). And,

u

[t]he discretion

of adopting

the

findings as submitted to the trial court is exclusively in that
court as long as the findings are not clearly contrary to the
evidence." Boyer Co., 567 P.2d at 1114.
In James, before rendering its decision, the trial court asked
the parties to submit memoranda and asked the State to prepare
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 858 P. 2d at 1015.
The defendant noted its objections to the findings in a filing with
the court. Jd. The court then signed the State's findings. Id.
Later, the court held a motion hearing and the trial judge "again
denied the [defendant's] motion, stating that his view of the facts
was consistent with the findings of fact which he had signed." Id.
On appeal, the * [d]efendant . . . claim[ed] that the trial
court should not have adopted . . . the findings . . . prepared by
the State because the[] findings did not truly reflect th[e] . . .
court's own assessment of the evidence. [The] [d]efendant further
argue[d] that the findings [we]re inconsistent . . . with both the
evidence and the . . . court's earlier oral findings." 858 P.2d at
1015.

l

See also Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah
1998) ("The law is well settled that a trial court may ask counsel
- typically the prevailing counsel - to submit findings to aid the
court in making . . . necessary determinations.").
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In affirming the trial court, this Court instructed that,
w

[w]hen there is inconsistency between a memorandum decision and

written findings and conclusions, it may be that the trial judge
has changed his or her mind," id., and that
whether

the

trial

court

adequately

"[i]n determining

participated

in

adopting

findings prepared by counsel, Utah's appellate courts look to the
record and will affirm the findings if there is xno indication from
the

record

. .

. that

the

trial

court

failed

to

adequately

deliberate and consider the merits of the case.'" Id.

(quoting

Automatic Control Prod. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780 P.2d 1258,
1260 (Utah 1989)). In other words, "findings . . . adopted verbatim
by a trial court are considered to be those of the trial court
judge and may not be rejected out-of-hand, but they will stand if
supported by the evidence." James, 858 P.2d at 1015.
Similarly,

in Tel-Tech, the district

court

judge, at the

conclusion of the trial, "took the case under advisement, allow[ed]
both parties to submit memoranda, and later requested both parties
to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law." 780
P.2d at 1260. The party whose findings were not selected appealed,
"contend[ing] that the trial court erred in mechanically adopting
the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepaired and submitted
by counsel for Tel-Tech without modifying or changing them in any
respect." Id. The appellate court ruled that

u

[t]here

[wa]s no

indication from the record . . . that the trial judge failed to
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adequately deliberate and consider the merits of the case," id.,
and, in so doing, noted that the court permitted both parties to
submit memoranda and proposed findings. Id.
Additionally, the appellant in Tel-Tech further contended (as
Respondent does in this case) that it was not notified of the
court's signing of the findings. Jd. The appellate court rejected
that argument as well, stating:
Nor was there any error in the failure of the trial court
to notify ACP's counsel promptly after he had signed his
findings of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment.
Our rules do not require the court to give notice but put
the burden on counsel to check periodically with the
clerk of the court as to the date of entry of the
findings and judgment so that post-trial motions may be
timely filed.
Id.
In the instant case, at the conclusion of the trial, the trial
court

judge

expressed

his

intent

to

take

the

matter

under

advisement, and then stated: "I'm going to order each of you to
prepare findings, conclusion [sic] and a decree and simultaneously
submit those. I'm thinking 3 0 days. If you want to do it - will
that work for both of you?" R. 598:268-69. Counsel for both parties
responded

affirmatively.

R.

598:269. Respondent's

counsel

then

expressed a desire to input footnotes into the proposed conclusions
of lawr

opposed to preparing a memorandum, and the trial court

replied that either would be fine. R. 598:269-70.
accordance with the court's order, counsel for the parties
submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and,
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pursuant

to

the

court's

request

that

both

parties

prepare

a

proposed decree, Petitioner's counsel prepared a decree, while
Respondent's counsel did not. R. 598:268-69; 323-71. On September
4,

2008,

the court

entered

Petitioner's

findings

of

fact and

conclusions of law and decree. R. 350-71. Petitioner's counsel, on
that date, mailed the Notice of Entry of Decree of Divorce to
Respondent's counsel. R. 3 72-73.
Following the entry of the decree, Respondent filed several
post-trial motions. R. 387-478. Petitioner filed a memorandum in
opposition to Respondent's motions. R. 493-502. The court held a
hearing on Respondent's motions on September 25, 2008. R. 599:1-22.
At the hearing, in response to Respondent's

protestations

concerning the court's signing of Petitioner's documents, the court
stated: "After the trial I indicated that I wanted you to prepare
findings, conclusions and a decree and I could pick one or the
other or make one up somewhere in between." R. 599:2. Following
argument by counsel, including Respondent's counsel's airguments
concerning notes made by the court following trial, the trial court
further explained:
[L] et me indicate that when I reviewed both of your
proposed findings and conclusions I did not mechanicailly
adopt Allred's findings but they were consistent with my
own thinking. The only reason I show you those notes from
my dictation the day after trial was just to show you
where I was and what I was thinking. If Allred's findings
vary somewhat from those notes, that's fine. When I
reviewed his I totally agreed with what he put down and
how it was presented.
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R

599:12. After Respondent's counsel referred to the court's post-

trial notes as findings
"intended t : be pai :

the court replied that trie n^tes were not
- the court i_^_.

599:13. The court then commented:

.

;. : tpar ed • I I

.

"I don t want the record

that

goes tc tl le C :>i :i i: t : f i appeals t :> . . . sa } I::l la J: tl :i :i s :i s a p i oposed
ruling. A l l :i t i s is a m a t t e r of formulation of present
.• . : r

:i r

I: 1 E :Ia y after

tl: i s t::ii : :i a J

thought

a i :i :i I :l :i ::t:a ted tl i : se :i i 1 s : i t i E

hurry and I didn't intend them to be actual final conclusions of
[: 3. i c: :] decree
When

599 : 1 3 ,

Respondent's

"essential]
: i.iia.ags

'R

,:

counsel

persisted

that

. . . f~,v [ re r i'
^^^

ana

u

had

' : " ieter^im : \

^c.^ns

fourr once aaain explained-

the court

^:

. .,

.-»...

~n

L. - .

i n-ard {• ^ ^ s e , 1 was attentiv*

;* A__Lred's conclusions a n a findings, : aid not iust mechanical,;/

signed them a m

: "v: not going to set them aside
i lot

r

:99:1^-20,
.

•-

Petit Lonei ' s tindings. Both pdities L.eci iriai memoranda p n o i
the trial, and the coi irt reviewed both memoranda before the tri a 1
^JL -

began,
\ roposed
;. Lei

.» .i

f indi nan

-^-. - ^.;i:ig

t;ie trial, both parties offer ed

of "act and cone' usions
-' •. • -

: ] a;

which

ic : •! , i 1 /;

wei e
I!

323 6 7 .

Respondent's proposal even included a memorandum reasserting his
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theory of the case and his legal authorities. R. 324-32. Hence, the
trial court was well aware of both parties' factual and legal
interpretations of the case. At the post-trial hearing, as set
forth above, Judge Anderson repeatedly expressed that he carefully
considered the findings and did not mechanically adopt them, but
instead agreed with Petitioner's findings in full.
Respondent highlights a few differences between the court's
notes

from

the

day

after

trial

and

the

executed

findings.

Appellant's Br. at 19-20. Without delving into the correctness of
Respondent's characterization of either the court's notes or the
findings, the court made clear that the notes were not meant to be
findings and were made without

the benefit

of the record, R.

599:13-14, and that the court agreed with findings as executed. R.
599:19-20. Moreover, as mentioned in James, even "[w]hen there is
inconsistency between a memorandum decision and written findings
and conclusions, it may be that the trial judge has changed his or
her mind." 858 P.2d at 1015.
Respondent also alleges that the trial court committed an
"unconstitutional abdication of basic judicial authority and an
illegal delegation of judicial function." Appellant's Br. at 21. In
the context of a case involving court commissioners, this Court
opined:
[C]ore judicial functions include: "(1) the power to hear
and determine controversies between adverse parties and
questions in litigation, (2) the authority to hear and
determine justiciable controversies, (3) the authority to
27

enforce a n y v a l i d judgment, decree, o r order, a n d (4) all
powers that are n e c e s s a r y to protect the fundamental
integrity of the judicial branch."
Buck v. Robinson, ^^.

.:..

v. T h o m a s , 961 P ?6 ? ^

. 6 18 (quoting Sta te

?>o? -Utah 19^8) .emphasis removes • ,

C :>re j u d i c I a i L unc Liuna ,
functions that are generally
such as conducting
fact
pretrial c o n f e r e n c e s , and
j u d g e s . In these instances
r e m a i n s w i t h t h e "Midge."
B u c k , 20 0'8 IJT A p p 2 8
544 ,

T[-

"

iiuw •u^ not inc 1 uuc
assij:.-; to 'assist' courts,
finding h e a r i n g s ,
hold.ng
making recommendations to
i ill t.i m a 1 ~^ j u d i c i a l p o w e r

j u o t m g Salt hake city v. Ohms, 8 81 P. 2d

.Tt ah 1 - :4

1 n. !
< :.

,

\ 11"J

dif f ei: ences between part 11; s

court c o m m i s s i o n e r s , core -judicial functions remain unchanged, and
' i i ii I i" n , r p r i ' "

*

•udicial

role,

but rather

'~^r'

*

prepare

propose-;

-

.-naingL

sought

after

.

receivmq

JO.JC

-

b y asking

of

and

fact

pointed

a n d raised

-v* u n f a v o r a b l e

result.

in

the parties

to

conclusions

of ! ^ w .

concerns

In any case,

- ,,... .,* e - -

;:3

only

the cxn irt

11: I e f :i i I a 3 d e :: :i s i o i :i i V s i 1 " <::i

hearing;

the couxt

u

c: i

»r [ s e t s o f f :i n d :I i l g s ] o :i : [ c o i :i 3 d 1 I

ma [dj e one u}. somewhere in between," R
" i--nits

i I

assistance,

constitutional

out at the post trial

i-

• i i r r p T l d *31

at the time the court invoked the

r e t a i i i e d :i t s = s s e i 11 i a 3 r o 3 e 1 2
court

111 11

the p a r t i e s '

. order,

R e s p o n d e n t ' s counsel concurred
procedure

i I iii

599:2. The court's choob.^g

• Lindings does not negate the court's exercising of

. imate discretion,,
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Respondent

further

complains

that

he

did

not

have

the

opportunity, under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
object to Petitioner's proposed decree. Appellant's Br. at 25. Rule
7's

provisions

regarding

preparation

of

orders

by

prevailing

parties and objections by losing parties, by their own terms, apply
in circumstances where parties are not "otherwise instructed by the
court." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f) (2) . In this case, at the end of trial,
the court "order[ed] each of

[the parties] to prepare findings,

conclusion [sic] and a decree and simultaneously submit th[em]." R.
598:268-69. Petitioner did so, and mailed the proposed decree to
Respondent on August 7, 2008. R. 368. Respondent registered no
objection to Petitioner's proposed decree with the court, and did
not, as instructed by the court, prepare his own proposed decree.
Moreover, the decree was consistent with the findings made by
the court and Respondent had the opportunity to enunciate, and have
the court address, his points of opposition to the decree at the
post-trial hearing, R. 599:1-22, whereat the court affirmed the
decree, while extending the deadline for Respondent to comply with
the decree. R.

599:17.

In sum,

if the court erred,

it was a

harmless error under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
as

the

court's

action was

not

"inconsistent

with

substantial

justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 61.
Respondent also takes exception to the "argumentative" nature
of the findings. Appellant's Br. at 26. By necessity, findings are
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a r g u m e n t a t i v e in t h e sense that they r e s o i . ^ factual a.spute?

What

is m o r e , t h e e x a m p l e he c i t e s , of the Ballard property. dr>es n-' r
accurately

ref 1 ect

properties -

11 ie

f ii idings ,

I Ie

-.
:v ; o n e .

a n 80 acre p a r c e l a n d a 4-acre parcel

Tl le f:i n iiii lgs 1 i B : 1 ia] ] ei iges ai e findi rigs 2 6 ai i :i 2 7

A/1: :i :i c l I state :

26. After completing the home,, the parties decided to
further expand Brough Trucking. In March 2004, they
purchased 80 acres in Ballard to be used for a gravel pit
and fill dirt. The 8 0 acres was titled in Brough
Trucking. Petitioner remodeled an old trailer house which
was moved to the property to be used as a scale house and
office. . . . The purchase price for the 80 acres was
paid by Brough Trucking.
2 7. Ii i May 2 0 04, the p ar ties jointly acquired 4 acres
with utilities adjacent to the 8 0 acres. The 4 acres were
titled in the names of the parties as joint tenants. The
purchase price was paid by Brough Trucking. The parties
fh^-n deeded that property to Brough Trucking.
R. 3 59.

There is nothing inaccurate in tl lese findings. They 7r_~

supported by the record as demonstrated by references to the record
i n this brief's statement of facts.
Final] y

Respondent refers to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules )f

Civil Procedure. Appe^-ant:' ,:; -:. at _c ..

.:.s argument on thi s

poinr is somewhat opaque, as i.t unclear whether he is unhappy that
11 I e • :::: : i 11: t ::i :i • ::i i i : t :i s s u e o i a 3 f :i i l d :i i l g s
sufficient

findings

or

both.

Although

f :i i id :i i igs , :i t :i :: E s i i :: t i = cji i :i i =
only

that

"tl le court

shall

find

11 I a t t: 1 I e ::: : • I 1 1 t :il :i • :i n c t :i s

Rule

permits

oral

t l lat f :i nd:i i lgs I: B I t ia de oral ] A,
the facts

specially

a n d state

s e p a r a t e l y its c o n c l u s i o n s of law t h e r e o n . " U t a h R. C i v . r. o2 (a .
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I: i it

In addition, Respondent does not indicate any way in which the
findings are insufficient to allow meaningful appellate review.
Simply

stated,

while

Respondent

forcefully

recounts his

displeasure with the trial court's actions, he has not established
either that the trial court mechanically adopted the findings or
that there are findings unsupported by the evidence. Accordingly,
the findings should remain undisturbed.
III. RESPONDENT WRONGLY ARGUES THAT THE COURT FOUND A
WAIVER OF THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT, AS THE COURT
PROPERLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED THE PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT.
"Premarital agreements 'concerning the disposition of property
owned by the parties at the time of their marriage are valid so
long as there is no fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure.'"
In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1994) (quoting Huck v.
Huck, 734 P. 2d 417, 419 (Utah 1986)) . * [A] t their most basic level,
premarital agreements are a type of contract and thus generally
should be tested by ordinary contract principles," In re Beesley,
883 P.2d at 1346, although "'[s]ince a husband and a wife do not
deal at arm's length, a fiduciary duty of the highest degree is
imposed in transactions between them.'" Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^20
(quoting 41 C.J.S. Husband & Wife § 87 (1991)). Further,
"where there is doubt about the interpretation of a
contract, a fair and equitable result will be preferred
over a harsh and unreasonable one. And an interpretation
that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted
only where the contract so expressly and unequivocally so
provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation
to be given it."
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Peirce,

<. •
_ -^

Trr

7

%3 9 (quoting P l a i n City Irr. C o . v. H o o p e r I r r .

Co. , '*5 6 P.2d 6 2 5 , 628 (Utah I 9 6 0 ) ) .
' ..t

: ' > instant c a s e , R e s p o n d e n t p r e t e s t s t:;at i .court

erred

:i i i a d o p t i n g

findings

pi eni iptia] agi eeniei it. • I I ssp

"

.vaiver

s B: :

n o t a r i z e d p r e n u p t i a l a g r e e m e n t w a s enforceable,'' Pesp
The t::i : :i a3 ecu n : t:, 1 i oweve] : , adopte' :i i i :: i
premarital

agreement,

a n d , indeed,

aid e n r c r c e

K a t h r y n C u r f e w B a u m am,, in n o w a y associate.!
... • p e r s o n a l

properties.

^cv^ng .....

Brougn

properties. ;isc

.--•

j

nsets

's B r at 2 .

tne agieemei: ,

a c c o r d i n g to its c l e a r t e r m s , K , 3 5 6 - 5 ^ . r"N~ •1-r>--^-r-

to

*i^.- . ,

a n a i.o^a i

*MLU

,x 'money

+

c : * ••

^i Rici'iara J a-* *6

..^ ;Jlass S t o r e , a n y personal ^ r fami v
*

•

; a b > for a n v debt.- that

occu^e

not be liable for a n y debts that K a t h r y n Curfev; B a u m h a s a c q u i r e :
*

- 'd^i

c i A

-:. s trial memorandum, Respondent argued that the terse
v.-ren; ;r-~ i a "•

<. - • > • *'i>-: •

1: :: • a ] ]

:: f

B: : c i igl l Ti i icki i lg,

including tht ciajit diiu atnei a s s e t s b o u g h t d u r i n g the m a r r i a g e , r .
3 0 8 , w h i l e h e c o n c e d e d that "the N e o l a r e s i d e n c e
•in t h e scope

cr. irie pre-marita., centia,.

r

wajs net included
.. .-.

.;

N o w , ^^

a p p e a l , R e s p o n d e n t e x p a n d s h i s v i e w of the a g r e e m e n t , c l a i m i n g t- rill.

I.nnjuciyt

J nipci 1.1 ;.

I M IIMIIIIIIII ill I

I biuugh

Ti u u k i - u y ,

a,s

welJ

ds

=

of the N e o l a h o m e . R e s p . ' s B r . at 3 3 , M e a n w h i l e , P e t i t i o n e r , a t
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trial, argued that the prenuptial agreement by its clear language
applied

only

to

the

assets

that

existed

at

the

time

of

the

marriage, R. 2 96, and maintains that position on appeal.
The trial court ruled that the agreement applied only to the
properties existing at the time of the marriage as enumerated on
the document. R. 356-57. The court then awarded Respondent property
in Randlett owned prior to the marriage and a credit for the sum of
$44,000.00, which was the value of the NJ Trucking assets at the
time of the marriage. R. 356. The court observed that the Glass
Shop was gone, and that the Duchesne shop and home had been sold
with the proceeds used for the trucking company expenses.2 R. 356.
The trial court did not find any ambiguity and applied the
contract

language

according

to

its

terms.

The

court's

interpretation of the document is consistent with the language
located therein, while Respondent's position that the agreement
entitles him to the entirety of the business, including

items

purchased with marital earnings, and the marital home, titled in
joint tenancy and acquired years after the marriage, is not.
What is more, if there were uncertainty as to meaning of the
contract, the uncontested testimony of Petitioner, and the facts
support the distribution made by the trial court. Petitioner, in

2

The trial court also found that the Duchesne home lost its
designation as separate property, because of the extensive efforts
Petitioner made to remodel and improve the home and the fact that
marital monies were paid on the mortgage. R. 3 54.
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this case, testified that Respondent's elder children wanted her
and

Respondent

to

ha ve

a

prem I^L^C^

agreement.

R.

598:14.

Petitioner was agreeable to tl le idea, as she '"didn't want anything
that

[Re spondent ]

ha d

pr i or

[ to

Respoi ident thoug 1 11: 11 I
R.

598:15.

the

mar r iaqp

::>i ei inpti a ] -j^^'i^ie;-.

Nevertheless,

to appease

the children,

98:1 1.
.*.aL - .

"

Petitioner

conta cted a n a tt srne^r t : • :i i iqi ii i e as t- : • tl le : ' : s t c: f a , ]:: i: ei iupt:i <E I
agreement,
counsel,

and, when

JJUI

Petitioner

informed

of the cost, chose n o t to retain

- r ~-r a ro i t 11< • r f u • 1 f
testified,

that the p a r t i e s ' intent

a n d the Respondent

d i d not disagree,

ii i preparing the document w a s that si xe

wouic not claim a n interest iT . J ^ L Respondent h a d at the time of
the marriage, but that she should have a part of anything acquired
:i i I t: 1 i ::!. f i 11 u i c , 1 1

598 16

a i 1 • :1 t h e parties' 1

actions c o r r e s p o n d e d

with this expression. For instance, as outlined in the next section

company,
" . an

:

•

as the parti.es were ouiidn:--

•-

-:

•

•

together,
. . . • -

•-

ua^nieSb p r o p e r t i e s , sne signea on a loan :-:•: ., i IJ . , _
expenses and ~he labored o n , contributed
listed as a

financially

she was a
,^

: r ts

t :

i or "ompany
to and wc s

~-^ tenant o n the marital home. Respondent

argues

that notwithstanding h e r having done a.l • this and having also acted
s

teei iaa-

, .aren,

Petitioner

should

nonetheless be entitled to no interest i 11 the business or the h o m e ,

due to the premarital agreement. This position does not comport
with the language of the agreement or the parties' actions after
signing the agreement, and would constitute severe exploitation of
Petitioner. In any case, regardless of the attendant circumstances,
the clear language of the agreement is consistent with the trial
court's interpretation and the division of the property.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY
DIVISION, WHERE PETITIONER WORKED FOR THE BUSINESS
WITH LITTLE PAY TO BUILD THE BUSINESS AND MADE
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BUSINESS IN THE FORM OF
CONSTRUCTION WORK PERFORMED, WHERE THE MARITAL HOME
WAS TITLED JOINTLY AND PETITIONER PAID MONEY TOWARD
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MARITAL HOME, SUPERVISED
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOME AND DID MUCH OF THE
CONSTRUCTION HERSELF, WHERE MONIES DEPOSITED BY THE
SALE OF SEPARATE PROPERTY BY RESPONDENT WERE NOT
SEGREGATED OR TRACED TO HOME CONSTRUCTION AND WHERE
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND FAIRNESS AND EQUITY DEMANDED
THE PROPERTY DIVISION MADE,

"When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include
in it equitable orders relating to the . . . property, debts or
obligations, and parties." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1). "Marital
property is ordinarily all property acquired during marriage and it
'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the
parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn
v. Dunn, 802 P.2d

1314, 1317-18

(Utah Ct. App. 1990)

(quoted

authorities omitted). "Generally, the rule for premarital property
is that each party retain the separate property he or she brought
into the marriage. Some exceptions include where the property has
been commingled so that it has lost its separate character, or

where it is fair, just and equitable to do' otherwise." Jd. at 13.21
(citations omitted).
Premar i tal property ± 0 ^ ^ x L a a epcu. dit ± • .1- L 1 ^ i t y
becomes part of the marital estate if "(1; the other
spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed
to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that
property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it,
or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity
lost through commingling or exchanges where the acquiring
spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the
other spouse.
Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 4 0 5,
Mortensen '
u

ai id

f 20 , 147 P , 3d 405 (quoting

Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)). Furthe 1 ",

[t]he rule that property acquired

by one spouse should be

awarded t<* u.^u spouse on divorce

d^es not apply . . . wl lei 1

the acquiring spouse places ;,^: ^

«.-.. , . . ..* names in such a

manner as to evidence

an intenr

to :nar>

marital property."

Mortensen.
more
" \:R'
134,
" ••"

!.tr

.,\i *

T^

. onsider

property

- tl

during

:3aiJoe._ . . jdarjje:

136 (Utah
*;

acquired

Ct. App. 1990),
-™ari ta]

and the naking

property fi :om ma 1

instaliment:
~~

commingling, .junn, 802 P. 2a CIL. 1321.
" the

distant case, Respondent argues, as he did at trial,

::;dt -OLicioner should receive no interest 11 1 the marital home or
the crane and trucking business. Respondent does not marshal tl le
ti ia]

:: ::>ii:i : t ,

p r em i s e d

up'.:

::tei isi e f :i 1 id 1 1 lgs : 1 1 tl 1 3 j: 1 : o p e i t y cl:i ? :i si • ::>i 1 :i ssues ,
11 1 2

principles
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heretofore

outlined,

consequently,

his

challenge

entertained.

It

would

be

restrictions

and

repetitious

to
both
to

the

findings

impractical
recite

all

should
due
the

to

not

be

length

findings

or

citations to the record for the findings, as they may be located in
the findings of the court and the statement of the case found in
this brief. Suffice it to say, there is overwhelming evidence to
support the trial court's property division with regard to both the
trucking business and the home.
First, as to the business, it is important to make an initial
point.

The trucking

business

was never operated

as an entity

distinct from the parties. Both parties worked in the business,
even living in the shop for two years, the parties seldom took
salaries and they paid family and personal expenses from Brough
Trucking, including expenses such as vehicles, fuel, clothing,
utilities,

furniture

and

groceries. R.

598:28,34,45,86,95,138-

3 9,213. Both parties were on the trucking company account, R.
598:34, both parties and the expert testified that the personal
expenses

of

the

parties

were

paid

from

the

corporation,

R.

598:34,86,95,138-39,213, and both parties also testified that they
rarely paid themselves any salary from the corporation. R. 598:2324,95,213-14. Indeed, Petitioner testified that she rarely took a
salary, because Respondent and she were trying to build the company
together. R. 5 98:23. This testimony is supported by the record. For
instance, in 1999, the year when Petitioner remodeled the Duchesne
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home,

began

working

on

the

Roosevelt

shop

and

worked

regu] ar

workdays in Roosevelt, commuting with Respondent from Duchesne to
Roose velt, si le took 01 ily $3,361

jalary

:

J. ~_

W2 records indicate that Petitioner was paid salary of $1

^.

64 0 JO

'3:93-95; Resp.'s Trial Ex. :C. An.;, Petitioner usea the salary
pa :i :i f : •: : 1:1 I a

fa i i: i:i ] }

.- • . •

-^.

5y 8: $ s .
Moreover,

Petitioner

made

valuable

c ,_*

b u s i n e s s . She engaged in a hoc*- of activities ; oi
benefit, such as clean 1 , ncr th^ shoo,
one d

So>—1^:

. IIL- company

s

as secretary, driving

m e t u c K s wnen neeaea, a.,j sign^n^ „:. _.^u_:.t ^ ^a:;., t^ pay on

the crane an;i other assets

-

\ *< 47-48,248. She reniode ! -d
i

corporation

r.

598:25-28,91-92.

Petitioner

alsr

cai-a

^e

: i

to the completion of high school, though they were not her children
by either b ] ood

*

, 5 9«-?»

strengthened Respondent. ^ custody posiLiuh u s - d - v i s rus exwii-,
and allowed him to devote time, to the b u s i n e s s . Petitioner

even

disbursed m o n e y to Respondent's children out c,. wl lat little pay she
took from the business-'. r

598:35. She sianed with P^^p^nd^n* - •: .* a.
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The business increased dramatically in value over the course
of

the marriage. In 1999, near the beginning of

the parties'

marriage, the trucking business made $180,000. R. 598:220. By 2005,
prior to the parties' separation, the business earned $843,000. R.
598:220. The reason for this increase in value was the acquisition
of the crane and other assets and the additional work those assets
provided.

R.

598:30-33. These

additional

assets were

acquired

during the marriage, with income earned during the marriage and a
personal joint loan. R. 598:30-33,219.
Next, Respondent argues that Petitioner should receive no
interest

in the marital

however, at least

home. Resp.'s

Br. at

three important points

35. There are,

supporting

the trial

court's awarding of half of the value of the home to Petitioner.
First, regardless of any contributions made to the home by
Petitioner or the tracing of the construction costs to separate
property, the parties titled the home in joint tenancy, evincing an
intent to hold the property jointly. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 3 07.
They also signed jointly on the promissory note for the purchase of
the acreage upon which the home is located. R. 598:37-38.
Second, Petitioner made vast contributions to the home, even
doing much of the construction work. She searched for suitable
locations for a home, R. 5 98:36, and the home's blueprints were
based on a floor plan she found. R. 598:40. Once building began,
Petitioner was responsible for spearheading the effort. R. 598:40.
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.m.

She went to the construction site on a ja-., ~a.si>
addition

to

matei ,a:s

coordinating

ana

physically

with

the

contractors,

she

: . In

picked
<

Loi ]<'"'ll mi

up
II ,

: :\c ] uciinq putting putty between the logs of the large structure. R,.

When, during the home-building process, Respondent fired the
g e i 1e i a 1

• : ""

culmination
a ssi stance fv

4

:

'

'* "
* r. • -

I: e t ,:i t:„ „i o i i e :i : a s s i :i„ n t e d,„
11

construction.

11 : e s p o ,;n„ s i 1: ,:i ] :i t;;;;!

5 9 8:40-43.

With

f :: i

t he

1 im,ited

others, she insulated the home, completed the sheet

rock installation, built a fruit room, constructed a, gun room, for
Respondent, and painted

wallpapered

and carpeted, the home. R,„.

598:42-44. Petitioner a_.sc u-.* the landscaping,
. :: the yard, trees and -i:i orchar-;

^ sprinkling system and •:-* lire
i 1 ] :i c l i,

replaced with a pipe fence. ••

Petitioner put

,

:

.^8:45. Once the pipe fence /;as <n

::; <* s/.imming pot,. A:_

v worked : i i tl i = \ • : • : • :!,, :i, = : ] : 1 1
not work on tl le home. R

. : m g } Jii,;g

. Responaent aesirea, ai.d

5,9 8

:

-^ . Respondent, meanwhile, did

593:46. Simply stated, Petitioner played

the prominent, part in the parties' home-b\ lilding endeavor,
Finally, Respondent claims that nearly a,l„] :>f the paymei its for
home construction came from, the trucking company accounts and a
p e r s oi i.a 1 a c e on in: I t

I le s ]:: • • 3 B :i : a t 10

I 2 1 ,:i t :i oi le i: :ic» e s

. • .* ,

that the bulk of the construction costs were paid from, the truckii i,g
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company. R. 598:42. As repeatedly noted in this brief, the trucking
company

paid

nearly

all

of

the

parties'

personal

expenses.

Respondent and Petitioner worked for the company but rarely took
any salary, as they were attempting to build the business. R.
598:23,34.
personal

(Because the parties took minimal salaries and paid
and

construction

expenses

through

the

business,

Respondent's contention that Petitioner has no interest in the home
is essentially akin to claiming that one's spouse is entitled to no
portion of the equity in a home purchased during the marriage with
the mortgage payments coming from the other party's salary, even
though

the

salary

of

the

paying

spouse

constitutes

marital

earnings.) Additionally, considering her minuscule compensation,
Petitioner's payment of roughly $1,400 from her separate account
toward the home and landscaping should not be summarily discounted,
R. 598:93, and Respondent accords no economic value to Petitioner's
sweat equity.
Respondent's attempts to trace alleged premarital monies to
the home were misleading and flawed. (The court made substantial
findings on this claim showing the failure of the Respondent to
trace any premarital monies to the home. See Findings 20-24 and
Conclusions 2,3,6-8, R. 360-61,353-56.) For example, Respondent
claims that the roughly $30,000 he received from the sale of the
Duchesne shop in May 1999 was used to build the Neola home in 2001.
Resp.'s Br. at 9; R. 598:224-25. However, by June 30, 1999, the
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m o n e y from the sale of the D u c h e s n e shop w h i c h h a d b e e n d e p o s i t e d
into the trucking c o m p a n y a c c o u n t in M a y w a s g o n e . ^.

J98:^25-?!

Similarly, R e s p o n d e n t c l a i m e d that the m o n e y from the sale < :

"

proper!:;/ w a s

"

R

5 9 8 I2 2 6

bl I t

t l le

i:a i i u a l K \

r • ::i i LI J i

* .- , \ ^ntiJ A u g u s t 2 2 , 2 0 0 0 , w h i l e the d o w n p a y m e n t
- t} ' sever al wee] is

2 0 00,

<=>

-hf N P " \

B a n d a n a R a n c h p r o p e r t y w a s u s e d for the down payment
- '- p -

.

. i e i : i :i i mg List 3 ,

and the down payment was made by NJ Trucking rather than

Respr * ^r*
Respondent t
598:227-28.

' •

;

Liia..iaudi

"-- 'lr - rom tl ie sa 1 e wen : e depc^i t
d c c o u n , . Resp

s "Trial

1

~>nnn

^ni.. ziie

]

:c.^^^;

.-_jp.

N J T r u c k i n g account wh;cn t^e

, _.

just w e e k s a f t e r the f.isl: deposi*

!'ur the c o m p a n i e s ' expenses

n

b) ' Oi l Apri;

* here w a s only $1,49

i: :;he :JJ

: : •.. June 2C "' deposit, ^ r e c e d e d t::e

pi ircha se • :: f tl ie Ne c ] a pi: opert}

:i i :i A i i g i ist 2 0 00

a i l :I ::: ::>i: istri ict: c i i • : f

the N e o l a h o m e , c o m m e n c i n g , in J a n u a r y 2 0 01, b y several m o n t h s . 4 R.
3

At
deposits
deposits
provided
and u s e d

o

and

R e s p o n d e n t al • ^aed w e ? - fro^ the sale of either the shop or nome
Duchesne. II

; 4

Ex.. . \:

There w e r e d e p o s i t s of $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 , o n A p r i l 1 2 , 2<

$ 5 4 , 0 0 0 , o n June

:

trial,
. ere w a s little if a n y e v i d e n c e showing the
w e r e from the sale of p r e m a r i t a l assets as o p p o s e d to
of m o n i e s r e c e i v e d o n a c c o u n t s p a y a b l e for services
to o t h e r s b y the company. A l l the m o n i e s were c o m m i n g l e d
to p a y c o m p a n y e x p e n s e s ,

\

The trial court also tww;^ that ti^ ^uchesne home and Bandai la
Ranch properties should not be credited against marital property,
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598:230. Respondent

cites

a $50,000 deposit

on May

17, 2001,

Resp.'s Br. at 9, but that amount was deposited into a money market
account, and Respondent does not trace that amount from the money
market account into spending on the home. R. 598:178, Resp.'s Trial
Ex.

15(b).

Trucking

Respondent

account

also claims other

from

alleged

sale

of

deposits

into the NJ

equipment.

R.

598:179;

Resp.'s Trial Ex. 15(b).
With

the exception of

the deposit

into

the money market

account, for which Respondent established no ties to spending on
the home, and the Bandana Ranch property sale which Respondent
claimed was intended to pay the down payment for the Neola land
(although the money was received after the down payment and the
down

payment

was

made

by

NJ

Trucking

rather

than

Respondent

individually, though money from the sale of the Bandana Ranch went
into an individual account), Resp.'s Trial Ex. 15(a); R. 598:22728, all of the deposits Respondent claims went into either the NJ
Trucking or Brough Trucking account. They were not segregated to
pay for the Neola home, and, indeed, Respondent conceded that the
monies received from the sale of the properties were not separated,
but were simply lumped into the trucking company account and used
to pay trucking company bills including the expenses of the company

due to the expenditure of marital income to pay installment
payments
on
the properties' mortgages
and
the
extensive
improvements to the Duchesne home made by Petitioner. R„ 354.
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for the year the Respondent ^ i eg was broken and he did not work.
i-.. 5 9R:226; Finding

^v.

commingling,, nevertheless
I <i Li ,

| 11, > I

award

< 1111 I t t j u L I ri J i \J : , "

ir

„- absence of

separate property
i» u '' 'I- » | ill

bumi,

"where it
I 'i 1 \--t-

r a i s e d t h i s i s s u e i n t h e t r i a l memorandum., R. 2 9 2 - 9 4 , a n d . ;: *• =;
a r g i im e i I t a t t: i: :i a ]

1 <: 2 6 6 6 8 , a i l ::i t h e t: r :i a 3 :: c • i 1 1 t: f c i 11 i :i 11 I a
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tna i

-ourt

also

found, that

Petitioner's net monthly income was $1,656.00, while her monthly
expenses, not including attorney fees, were $1,695.00, R. 358;
Pet.'s Trial Ex. 5 (Financial Declaration) , that Petitioner had not
been able to pay the fees she accumulated prior to trial and that
"she d[id] not have the means to pay the additional fees incurred
in preparation for the trial and the trial." R. 357,352. Moreover,
the court found that Respondent continued to pay personal expenses,
including legal fees, through Brough Trucking, R. 3 51,3 58, and that
"Respondent, having the full control of Brough Trucking, ha[d] the
much greater ability to pay the expenses including appraisal costs
and legal fees in th[e] case." R. 3 51. The court found that, the
year prior to the parties' separation, Brough Trucking had income
of $785,250.00. R. 365. See Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ^[31

("Of

particular relevance are the trial court findings that Husband 'had
the greater ability to pay attorney fees, ' and that Wife had a
greater need for financial assistance. By making these findings,
the trial court comported with the [statutory] requirements . . .
.") .

In short, the trial court made findings as to each of the
three requisite elements in assigning fees and costs. Furthermore,
Respondent does not quarrel with the court's findings with respect
to either his ability to pay or the reasonableness of the costs and
fees. Resp.'s Br. at 43-47.
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Respondent does posit that Petitioner could afford to pay
attorney fees, because ushe had four or five separate credit cards
. . . and she could have used [them] to make payments on attorney's
fees." Resp.'s Br. at 46. Respondent does not, however, explain how
Petitioner

could

then

pay

off

her

credit

card

balances,

particularly with the added interest, when her monthly expenses
completely consumed her monthly income.
Respondent further protests that Petitioner has a promissory
note with counsel for attorney fees, Resp.'s Br. at 45, while
Petitioner clearly denied there was any promissory note. R. 598:75.
Respondent also presses for Petitioner to pay the costs and fees
from of the property award she received. Resp.'s Br. at 46. While
Petitioner will receive property, she needs the property as she
prepares for retirement and to supplement her income, which is
already exhausted by her expenses and does not afford her any
leeway for unexpected or additional expenses.
As the trial court found, during the marriage, Petitioner took
a small wage and will receive far less in social security than she
would have if she had been paid the full amount for her services.
R. 353. Indeed, Petitioner rarely took money out of the company,
because

she

and

Respondent

were

trying

to build

the

company

together and she was "trying to save money" for the company. R.
598:23.

Consequently,

Petitioner

herself.
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did

not

set money

aside

for

At age 55, R. 3 53, and without having graduated from high
school,

R.

598:8,

Petitioner's

employment

prospects

are

constrained. As noted, at the time of trial, Petitioner was working
as "a laborer" for an insulation installer. R. 598:9. Meanwhile,
Respondent was awarded Brough Trucking, which Petitioner helped to
expand and which has paid Respondent's legal fees in this action,
and he has the potential to continue enjoying substantial income
therefrom.
VI.

PETITIONER SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEES AND
COSTS ON APPEAL.

In Lyncrle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (1992) this Court
instructed that "[g]enerally, when the trial court awards fees in
a domestic action to the party who then substantially prevails on
appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal." This
statement of law is widely accepted in Utah as the general rule.
See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ; Hill v.
Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Potter v. Potter, 845
P. 2d 272, 275

(Utah Ct. App. 1993) . In such cases, the Court

"remand [s] for entry of reasonable fees . " Lyngle, 831 P. 2d at 1031.
Petitioner, having been awarded attorney fees at the trial court,
should be awarded the fees and costs she incurs on this appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully requests
that the Court affirm the trial court's decision as to all issues
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before the Court on appeal and award Petitioner the fees incurred
on appeal.
DATED t h i s
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Attorneys for Appellee/Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
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Premarital Agreement
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Decree of Divorce
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IKATHRYN CURFEW BAUM AM tN NO WAY ASSOCIATED WITH AND HOLD NO CLAIM TO
ANY PERSONAL PROPERTIES, ASSETS OR MONEY OF RICHARD JAMES BROUGH, N.J.
TRUCKING INC., THE GLASS STORE, ANY PERSONAL OR FAMILY PROPERTIES. ALSO I WILL
NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEBTS THAT OCCURE FROM ANY OF THE ABOVE PROPERTIES.
RICHARD JAMES BROUGH WILL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DEBTS THAT KATHRYN
CURFEW BAUM HAS ACQUIRED,

KATfiRYNCURFfiWBAUM

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH
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Notary Pubac
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DISTRICT •
DUCHESNE CO'

CLARK B ALLRED - 0055
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
ALLRED & McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone:
(435)722-3928
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,
Petitioner,

)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

)

CONCLUSIONS

OF LAW

)

vs.

)

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

)

Civil No.

054000084

)

Judge John R. Anderson

The above case came before the Court for trial on the 9th day of
July, 2008. Petitioner was present with her attorney, Clark B Allred.
Respondent was present with his attorney, Randall Gaither.

Evidence was

received by the Court in the form of testimony and exhibits. Argument
was received by counsel and the Court took the matter under advisement.
The

Court having

reviewed

the

evidence

and

after being

fully

advised, makes these findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner was a resident of Duchesne County, State of Utah,

and had been for more

than three months

commencement of this action.

immediately

prior

to

the

2.

The Petitioner worked for the Respondent from 1993 to 1995.

She then worked for her husband, Mr. Baum, until they separated. In the
summer of 1997, she again started working for the Respondent at NJ
Trucking.
3.

On December 1, 1997, the parties started living together and

they married on July 14, 1998.
4.
children

At the time the parties married, the Respondent had two minor
from

a previous marriage. One of the reasons

the

parties

married was to assist the Respondent in obtaining custody of those two
minor children.
5.
majority

The Respondent
age. Those

also had

children

two older

insisted

that

children who were

the

Petitioner

of

sign

an

agreement not to claim any assets the Respondent then owned if the
parties divorced in the future. The Respondent stated that he thought
the request was dumb. The Petitioner, to appease the two children,
called an attorney, but, when informed of the cost of preparing

a

prenuptial agreement, elected to write out a one paragraph statement
which she and the Respondent signed which is Respondent's exhibit 1.
There was no discussion or disclosure of what each party owned. The
testimony

of the Petitioner, which was not

rebutted,

was that

the

statement was only to apply to assets owned on the date of marriage and
not to further acquired assets or improvements to those assets.
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6.

At the time of the marriage, the Respondent owned a business

called the Glass Shop that no longer exists, family property in Randlett
(to which the Petitioner has made no claim) , a home in Duchesne that had
a large mortgage against it, and a business called NJ Trucking. He was
also purchasing acreage in Bandana Ranches.
7.

At the time of the marriage, NJ Trucking had some vehicles,

trailers, and equipment. NJ Trucking had been valued at $44,000 a few
years earlier in the Respondent's prior divorce. The cost to acquire the
equipment

that remains

$93,124.00.

Its

present

from NJ Trucking, based on Exhibit
depreciated

value

is

$3,151.00.

27, was
The

1999

financial records and tax return shows that NJ Trucking had gross income
of $188,785.00.
8.

After the parties' marriage, the parties changed and expanded

the NJ Trucking business. They bought a crane for $135,000 and other
heavy equipment
Service Inc.

and changed

the name to Brough Trucking

and

Crane

Respondent remained the sole shareholder. In 2 004, the

year before the parties separated, the gross income had increased to
$785,250.00. Both parties worked in the business.

They seldom took

salaries and paid most of the family and personal expenses from Brough
Trucking.

The parties personally and jointly took out a $160,000.00

loan that was used to pay off the debt on the crane and other equipment.
The marital home was used as collateral for the loan.

3

The net value of

Brough Trucking at the time of the trial is $492,000.00. See Exhibit 3
Townsend appraisal.
9.

When the parties started living together and at the beginning

of the marriage, they lived in a home in Duchesne that was owned by the
Respondent. That home was subject to a substantial mortgage on which
$1,300.00 per month payments were made during the marriage.

Those

payments were made from earnings from Brough Trucking.
10.

The Petitioner, with her own labor and the assistance of her

son, remodeled the Duchesne house, including making a 2:00m out of the
patio, adding walls and windows, taking out a sliding glass door to open
up an area, painting, installing sheet rock, carpet and siding, and
replacing the old shower with a new bathtub. She also remodeled the
downstairs and added a wall, sheet rocked, painted and added cairpet
downstairs, put in light fixtures, and did yard work.
11.

Shortly after the parties married in September of 1998, the

Respondent's

son, Bryan, age 14, came to live with the parties. He

wanted to go to school in Roosevelt.

Just prior to the parties starting

to live together, the Respondent had purchased a shop in Roosevelt from
Drillers Inc. to use for Brough Trucking.

That shop was dirty and

needed repairs. The parties decided to construct living quarters in the
Roosevelt shop so that they could move to Roosevelt.
12.

The Petitioner, primarily by herself, but with assistance of

her children and the Respondent's children, built a bedroom, bathroom
4

and living area upstairs in the Roosevelt shop including sheet rock,
tile work and carpet.

Downstairs, she put in 2 bedrooms, a kitchen,

cleaned the shop and added floor tiles to the shop. Carpets were added
to all living areas and an office was constructed downstairs.
13.

In August of 1999, the Respondent's youngest daughter, Amanda,

age 12, came to live with the parties. The parties and the children
moved from Duchesne and started living in the Roosevelt shop.
14.

The parties then started looking for a more suitable home or

property on which to construct a home. The Petitioner looked at many
properties but did not find anything acceptable to both parties. In the
summer of 2000, the parties were talking to a Clare Duncan who said he
had some acreage for sale.
approximately
$50,000.00.

18

acres

The parties went and looked at the property,
near

Neola,

Utah,

and

made

an

offer

of

That offer was accepted and the transaction closed on

August 3, 2000.

The parties paid $20,000 down and jointly signed a note

for the balance of $3 0,000.00. The property was deeded jointly to the
parties.

The $20,000.00 down payment was paid from Brough Trucking just

as all other bills were paid from Brough Trucking.
15.

The parties then took plans and hired a general contractor.

Construction on the home started

in early 2001. The Petitioner was

responsible for coordinating the work.
site

on

a

daily

basis.

In

She went to the construction

addition

to

coordinating

with

the

contractors, she picked up materials and also worked on the home. The
5

home is a log home, and the Petitioner was the person that chinked (put
putty) between the logs.
16.

The

Respondent

then

fired

the

general

Petitioner took over the completion of the home.

contractor

so

the

Additionally, in the

summer of 2001, the Respondent broke his leg and was unable to help on
the

home

or

to

work

at

Brough

Trucking.

The

Petitioner

did

th€>

insulating of the home, completed the sheet rock, built a fruit room,
constructed a gun room for the Respondent, and painted, wallpapered and
carpeted the home.

The parties and the Respondent's two children moved

into the home at Thanksgiving of 2001. The following summer (2002) , the
Petitioner did the landscaping, including putting in the yard, trees and
an orchard, sprinkling system, fire pit and painting the fences.

Later,

she constructed a deck and swimming pool.
17.

The monies for constructing the home were paid primarily from

Brough Trucking
personal

and

checking

some payments

account

and

some

were made
from

the

from

the

Respondent's

Petitioner's

personal

checking account.
18.

The present value of the home is $325,000.00 which is less

than the parties paid to construct the home.

It is jointly owned by the

parties.
19.

During the marriage, the Respondent worked at Brough Trucking

(except for the year summer of 2001 to the summer of 2002 when his leg
was broken).

The Petitioner was involved in the remodeling and building
6

of the living quarters, the maintaining of the home and family and also
worked at Brough Trucking. The parties seldom took salaries from the
business. W2 records show the Petitioner was only paid $3,360 in 1999,
$10,640.00 in 2000, $8,880 in 2001, $7,680.00 in 2002 and $6,876.00 in
2003.

Both

parties

maintained

separate

checking

accounts.

The

Petitioner deposited her checks in her account and then used those
monies on the home, the family, and expenses for both her children and
the Respondent's

children.

Respondent

deposited

his monies

in his

account and used those to pay child support and legal fees in the early
part of the marriage and for personal and family expenses during the
marriage.

Since the parties took minimal salaries, almost all living

expenses,

food,

remodeling

of

utilities,

the

shop

and

transportation,
Duchesne

house,

housing

(including

the

payments

and

mortgage

building of the home) were paid with checks or credit cards from Brough
Trucking.
20.

The Respondent claimed that he should have credit against the

value of the home for premarital assets that were sold.

However, the

evidence did not support that claim. He was unable to trace those assets
and monies.

The evidence showed that monies from the sale of assets

were used for purposes other than the home including paying operating
expenses of Brough Trucking when the Respondent had a broken leg.
21.

Respondent claimed that the money from the sale of the Bandana

Ranch was used for the down payment of the 18 acres in Neola where the
7

home was built.

First, that property was paid for during the marriage.

Secondly, the 18 acres in Neola closed on August 3, 2000. The Bandana
Ranch was not sold until August 24, 2000 and the account the $18,512
went into was used to pay many different living and personal expenses .
22.

Respondent claimed the money from the sale of the Duchesne

shop should be a credit. He sold that shop on May 3, 1999. The down
payment of $28,983 was two years before the home was constructed and the
monies went into the general account at NJ Trucking and was spent for
expenses

of

NJ

Trucking.

The

balance

of

the

purchase

price

was

apparently received in 2000 (a year before the home was constructed) and
also went into the Brough Trucking general account and was used for
Brough Trucking expenses.
23.

Respondent also claims a credit of $30,000 for a rig he sold

in June 2 0 00 and other equipment he sold in 2000. Again, those sales
occurred well before the construction of the home, those monies went
into the general account at Brough Trucking and they were spent before
the land was bought or the home was constructed.
24.
the sale

Respondent also makes a claim for the $24,702.00 received from
of

substantially

the Duchesne
improved

home

in April

and remodeled

2002.

by the

That

home

Petitioner

had

and

monies were used to pay mortgage and taxes on the property.

been

marital

There* was

no showing where that money was deposited and no showing it was used on
the Neola Home.
8

25.

On October 9, 2002, the parties borrowed and jointly signed a

promissory note for $160,000.00. The home was used as collateral. The
money was used to pay off the loan on the crane and other equipment.
Respondent testified that, because of his broken leg and his inability
to work

for a year, the money was needed

to keep Brough

Trucking

operating. The money apparently was used to pay off the debt on the
crane and some other vehicles to reduce the monthly obligations of
Brough Trucking.
26.

After completing the home, the parties decided to further

expand Brough Trucking.

In March 2 0 04,

they purchased

Ballard to be used for a gravel pit and fill dirt.
titled in Brough Trucking.

80 acres

in

The 80 acres was

Petitioner remodeled an old trailer house

which was moved to the property to be used as a scale house and office.
That remodeling included framing, insulation, sheet rock, and wiring.
The purchase price for the 8 0 acres was paid by Brough Trucking.
27.

In May

2004,

the

parties

utilities adjacent to the 80 acres.

jointly

acquired

4

acres

with

The 4 acres were titled in the

names of the parties as joint tenants. The purchase price was paid by
Brough

Trucking.

The parties

then

deeded

that

property

to

Brough

Trucking.
28.

The Petitioner was the primary person involved in raising the

Respondent's two children.

She helped and encouraged them in school,

9

did the cooking, cleaning and laundry.

She also paid some of their

expenses from her bank account.
29.
argument.

Shortly after Amanda turned 18, she and the Petitioner had an
The Respondent then told the Petitioner to vacate the home.

The Petitioner vacated the home on August 1, 2 0 05, taking very few
personal items with her. She came back the next day and loaded some
items into a horse trailer.

The Respondent, however, took back the

horse trailer with most of the items.
30.

The personal property is all used property and has minimal

value. The values listed by the Respondent are either new values or
exaggerated.
31.

After

the

parties

separated,

the

employment as a laborer with Stanco Insulation.
with her mother.
next to her mother.

Petitioner

obtaiined

She presently resides

She has purchased a used trailer she is setting up
Her present net monthly income is $1,656.00 and her

expenses are $1,695.00 per month.
32.

The Respondent has continued to reside in the home and operate

Brough Trucking and continues to pay his personal expenses thru Brough
Trucking.
33.

Petitioner has incurred legal fees and costs in this matter.

The affidavit of the Petitioner's attorney shows that she had incurred
$15,391.53 in fees thru July 2, 2008.

He testified that he had incurred

an additional 10 hours in preparation prior to trial at $175.00 per
10

hour.

In addition, there was the time of trial and the post-trial work.

The affidavit sets forth in detail the work that was provided and the
hourly rates charged. In addition, the Petitioner paid $400.00 for the
appraisal of the home.
34.

The Petitioner has made some payments on her legal fees but,

based on her income and expenses, she has not been able to pay those
fees and she does not have the means to pay the additional fees incurred
in preparation for the trial and the trial.
35.

Respondent did not request reimbursement of legal fees in his

pleadings.

At trial, he requested that he be reimbursed for the costs

incurred in providing information to the appraiser of Brough Trucking.
There is also approximately $7,000.00 still owing for that appraisal.
The appraisal of Brough Trucking was based on an order of the Court.
Respondent was ordered to pay that expense with the Court reserving the
right to reallocate that expense. The appraisal was needed and helpful
to the Court in valuing the assets and deciding the division of the
assets.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes:
1.

The one paragraph prenuptial agreement was not negotiated by

the parties.

There

was no

disclosure

of

assets

in

the

prenuptial

agreement and it was prepared mainly to appease the older children. It
was intended to be limited to what the Respondent owned at the time of
11

the marriage as listed on that document. Items listed included the Class
Shop, the family properties m
at

the

time

of

the

Randlett, and the assets in NJ Trucking

marriage.

At

the

time

of

the marriage,

the

Respondent had also purchased the Roosevelt shop, and had the Duchesne
shop and the Duchesne home. Those properties were not listed on the
agreement, were not disclosed and became marital properties because oi
the marital funds used to pay for and enhance those assets and the
enhancements and improvements made by the Petitioner

x

The facts that the

Petitioner improved the other assets, signed jointly on a $160,000.00
loan and worked in the business also support the position that the
agreement was limited to assets and debts existing at the time of the
marriage.
2.

The Glass Shop no longer exists and there was no evidence that

any of its value remains. The Petitioner made no claim to the Randlett
properties.

There was little evidence as to the value of NJ Trucking at

the time of the marriage. The best evidence was the $44,000.00 value at
the Respondent's prior divorce.
3.

The monies from the sale of the Duchesne shop were deposited

in the general bank account of Brough Trucking and used for genera L
expenses of Brough Trucking. Those monies were received prior tc the
construction of the home and were not used m

Reese v
7 11120, 27.

the home

Since there is

Reese, 199 9 UT 75, ^ 2 4 - 2 5 ; and Pierce v. Pierce, 20 00 UT
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no showing or tracing of those monies to the home, there should be no
credit given against the value of the marital assets.
4.

The parties changed the nature of NJ Trucking and changed its

name to Brough Trucking. Petitioner was actively involved in Brough
Trucking and in the parties' successful efforts to increase its business
and its value.

She was also actively involved in enhancing the assets

of Brough Trucking.
value.

She remodeled the Roosevelt shop and increased its

She also built the scale house for the 80 acres.

She cosigned

on the $160,000.00 note to pay for the crane and other vehicles. The
monies to buy the crane, vehicles and land for Brough Trucking all came
from earnings during the marriage. The parties did not treat Brough
Trucking as a separate entity but paid all marital bills and living
expenses from Brough Trucking. The business and personal expenses were
commingled to make it impossible to determine what was personal and what
was

business.

Even

though

Brough

Trucking's

stock

was

in

the

Respondent's name, it is a marital asset less the $44,000.00 value at
the time of the marriage.
5.

The Roosevelt shop, though titled in the Respondent's name is

used in and is part of Brough Trucking. The valuation of Brough Trucking
by Mr. Townsend included the value of the shop. As noted above, the
Petitioner greatly enhanced the value of that shop by cleaning it and
building living quarters on the shop. The shop should be included in
Brough Trucking and is a marital asset.
13

6.

The Duchesne house was subject to a mortgage when the parties

married which mortgage was paid from earnings during the marriage. The
home was also remodeled

and

improved by

the Petitioner

during

the

marriage. The monies from the sale of the house were deposited in a
general

account

expenses.

which

was

spent

for

general

living

and

business

There was no tracing or showing that the monies from the sale

of the Duchesne house went into the Neola house. In addition, those
monies became marital assets because of the use of earnings during the
marriage

to pay

the mortgage

and

taxes and

the remodeling

by

the

Petitioner.
7.

The Bandana Ranch property was being purchased during the

marriage with earnings from the marriage. The money from the sale of
that property did not go to the down payment on the Neola property, as
claimed by the Respondent, but was spent on general expenses. There
should be no credit against marital assets given for those monies.
8.

The

Respondent

also

claimed

credit

for

a

rig

and

other

property he asserted that he sold and used the proceeds to pay on the
Neola house. The Respondent originally denied having any documents to
support

his

claim

of

premarital

assets.

Shortly

before

trial,

he

provided some documents and tried to introduce additional documents at
trial which the Court refused to receive because they had not be timely
disclosed. There was evidence of $3 0,000.00 from a rig. There was no
evidence showing that those monies went into the home, but rather those
14

funds went into the Brough Trucking account and were spent on Brough
Trucking expenses.2
9.

The Neola home was purchased

jointly by

the parties

and

remains titled in both parties' names. The Petitioner was the primary
person involved in the construction of that home, including doing much
of the construction herself. The monies for the construction of the home
came from earnings in Brough Trucking, from Petitioner's account where
she deposited her salary and from the Respondent's account where he
deposited his salary. It is a marital asset.
10.

The Petitioner was actively involved in the expansion of

Brough Trucking, she remodeled two living quarters and built the Neola
home, she raised the Respondent's two children thru their teenage years
and she was the person doing the cleaning and meals. The Respondent's
position, that all property was premarital and that Petitioner should
get no interest in it, would leave the Petitioner, at age 55, with
nothing. The small wage she was paid results in less social security
when she reaches retirement age than if she had been working for full
wages. Fairness and equity require that she receive one half of the
value of the Neola home and Brough Trucking (less $44,000 . 00) .3 Brough
2

Dunn v Dunn 802 P.2d 1314 (Ut.App. 1990) pre marital assets
that have been consumed, commingled etc loss their separate
status.
3

Hocrue v. Hocpae, 831 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Burke v.
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). See also Haumont v. Haumont, 793
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Trucking has a value of $492,000.00 less $44,000.00 and the house has a
value of $325,000.00. Therefore, the Respondent, if he wants to retain
ownership of the home and Brough Trucking, should be ordered to pay to
the

Petitioner

the

sum

of

$386,500.00.

In

the

alternative,

the

Petitioner should be awarded the Neola home and property with a value of
$325,000.00

and

the

Respondent

awarded

Brough

Trucking

and

the

Respondent ordered to pay Petitioner the difference of $61,500.00 and to
refinance the $160,000.00 debt to remove the home and Petitioner from
liability on that loan.
11.

The Petitioner should also be awarded the vehicle she drives,

subject to the remaining debt on it as of the date the decree is signed
and the personal property in her possession and the property listed on
Exhibit

24.

Respondent

should

be

awarded

the

remaining

personal

property, the horse trailer and the vehicle he drives.
12.

Petitioner waived her claim to alimony as her income presently

meets her expenses. However, her income is not sufficient to pay her
legal fees and costs. The financial declaration received by the Court
seems to be accurate and the expenses listed thereon are reasonsible.

P.2d 421 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Oliekan v. Oliekan, 2006 UT App 405, ^20; Dunn v.
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1321 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) (using marital funds to
make installment payments on separate property changes it to marital
property); and Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988) (listing
many factors the court considers).
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The Respondent has had

the benefit

of Brough Trucking

to pay

his

expenses and legal fees and he has resided in the home. The Respondent
should be ordered to reimburse the Petitioner for the legal fees she has
incurred.

The amount

of

legal

fees as

set

forth on the

Affidavit

submitted by Petitioner's attorney were necessary and the fees charged
are reasonable.4 In addition, the Petitioner incurred 10 more hours in
preparation and the time incurred for trial and post-trial work. An
additional affidavit

should be submitted as to the additional

time

incurred.
13 .

The cost for the appraisal of Brough Trucking was needed for

the valuation of the business. The Respondent should be required to pay
the balance

owing

on

that

bill.

There

is

no

basis

to

award

the

Respondent for expenses incurred by his secretary to provide information
to the appraiser. The Respondent, having the full control of Brough
Trucking, has the much greater ability to pay the expenses including
appraisal costs and legal fees in this case.
DATED this jJfc day of August,

'John K. Anderson
District Court Judge

4

Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
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DlSTRk T COURT

DUCH^X^ c;0, WTY, UTAH

SEP - '; 2308
CLARK B ALLRED - 0 055
CLARK A. McCLELLAN - 6113
ALLRED 8c McCLELLAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Petitioner
72 North 300 East (123-14)
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone:
(435)722-3928
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, ROOSEVELT DEPARTMENT

KATHRYN C. BROUGH,

)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

)
)

RICHARD JAMES BROUGH,
Respondent.

)

Civil No.

0540000084

)

Judge John R. Anderson

The above case came before the Court for trial on July 9,
2008.

The Court has entered an order divorcing the parties and

took the remaining issues under advisement. The Court has now
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based
thereon,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Respondent, if he wants to retain ownership of the home

and Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. (Brough Trucking), is
ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $386,500.00 within 90
days of the entry of this decree. He is to notify Petitioner's

counsel within 15 days of entry of the decree if he elects to
retain both assets.
2.

If the Respondent does not elect to retain ownership of

the home and Brough Trucking as provided above, then the Petitioner
is awarded the Neola home and property, the Respondent is awarded
Brough Trucking and the Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner
$61,500.00 for the difference in the value within 90 days of entry
of the decree.
3.

Respondent is ordered to refinance the $160,000 debt to

remove the home and Petitioner from liability on that loan.
4.

The Petitioner is awarded the vehicle she drives (subject

to the remaining debt on it as of the date this decree is signed) ,
the personal property in her possession and the property listed on
Exhibit 24.
5.

Respondent is awarded the remaining personal property,

the horse trailer and the vehicle he drives.

has

6.

Neither party is awarded alimony.

7.

Respondent is ordered to pay to Petitioner the amount she

incurred

in

legal

fees

and

costs

in

this

matter.

The

$15,391.53 set forth on the affidavit submitted as Exhibit 4, 10
hours at $175.00 per hour for preparation and 9 hours at $175.00

2

per

hour

for

trial

are

awarded

and ordered

to be paid.

addition, the Petitioner's counsel shall submit a

In

supplemental

affidavit for the time spent on post-trial matters. If Respondent
objects to the reasonableness of that amount, he shall file a
motion with the Court setting forth those objections and the Court
will set for hearing those objections.
8.

Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appraisal

performed by Brad Townsend.
9.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver, without

delay, any titles or other documents which are presented to either
one by the other and which are necessary to effectuate the transfer
of property as has been hereinbefore set forth.

3

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, Cheree Brotherson, am employed by the office of ALLRED &
McCLELLAN,
certify

P. C ,

that

I

attorneys
served

the

for Petitioner herein, and hereby
attached

BRIEF

OF

APPELLEE

on

Respondent/Appellant by placing two true and correct copies thereof
in an envelope addressed to:
RANDALL T. GAITHER
LAW OFFICE OF RANDALL GAITHER
159 WEST 300 SOUTH #105
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101
and deposited the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States mail at Roosevelt, Utah, on the
day of June 2009.

Cheree Brotherson
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